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Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 40, No. 5, 634-654 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/1078087404274136

Nested Levels of Institutions

State Rules and City Property Taxes

Barbara Coyle McCabe

Arizona State University

Richard C. Feiock

Florida State University

The new institutionalism concentrates on the nature and effects of rules, and intergovernmental relations on the levels of government. This article integrates these foci to present a model of nested institutions and levels of government, focusing on constitutional and substantive rules of governance in states and municipalities. The authors contend that cities’ constitutional rules (specifically their governance arrangements) shape local actors’ incentives and influence their implementation of state mandates. They argue further that the mere presence—not the actual evocation—of these rules casts a shadow that defines the actors’ decision space and that broad distinctions among laws have profound implications for the actors’ choices. They support this explanation by empirically testing propositions derived from the framework regarding property tax dependence in large cities between 1975 and 1995.

Key Words: property tax • form of government • intergovernmental • local governance • mandate


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